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Abstract
The U.S. financial crisis, which stemmed from the breakdown of the subprime loan, is expanding 
further and developing into a global ﬁ nancial crisis. This crisis is greatly inﬂ uencing East Asian countries 
that have experienced rapid growth.
This paper examines East Asian corporate governance just before the crisis. In this paper, East Asia 
means China, Hong Kong, Russia, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. That is, East Asia is China, Russia and 
the previous NIES.
As I discusses in detail, in both China and Russia, large state monopoly enterprises are born one after 
another as they move toward a market economy. Older state-owned enterprises are converting to large state 
monopoly enterprises, and the latter have a marked inﬂ uence not only on the country, but also on the entire 
world economy.
The following are features of state monopoly enterprises:
1. Although a state-owned enterprise is privatized, it maintains approximately two thirds ownership ratio to 
its public company as a holding company, and as a result substantially continues to control its management.
2. The most efﬁ cient part of all state-owned enterprise resources are transferred to a public company, and 
state monopoly enterprises continue to maintain monopolistic status in each market.
3. Such a monopolistic position brought about the adhesion and uniﬁ cation with politics, and, in certain 
cases, corruption.
In East Asia, the market-centered corporate governance in Japan and some other countries, along 
with the large state monopoly enterprises in China and Russia, is developing a new form of competition. 
The previous economic system competition is changing into the corporate system competition. In such 
conditions, I would like to examine whether or not the East Asian community can be established.
Section 1 summarizes East Asian business activity and its financial markets. Section 2 discusses 
大阪産業大学経済論集　第 10 巻　第２号
36
Chinese corporate governance, Section 3 discusses corporate governance in Russia, Singapore, Korea and 
Taiwan. Finally, Section 4 summarizes the relationship between East Asian corporate governance and the 
East Asian community, and the role of Japanese companies.
Introduction
On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers, the fourth-ranked securities firm in the U.S., 
announced they were applying for Article 11 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act. The U.S. financial 
crisis, which stemmed from the frozen subprime loan, is expanding further and developing into a 
global ﬁ nancial crisis.
This crisis is greatly inﬂ uencing East Asian countries that have experienced rapid growth. This 
paper examines East Asian corporate governance just before this crisis. For purposes of this paper, 
East Asia means China, Hong Kong, Russia, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. That is, East Asia is 
China, Russia and the previous NIES.
I would like to especially note China and Russia. After the Soviet Union socialist system 
collapsed, Russia was born. China is rapidly advancing toward a market economy while 
maintaining the old system. This paper’s most important objective is to show the actual conditions 
of corporate governance in these countries. Russia is a big power in Europe. However, Russia is 
also a major country in East Asia, bordering Japan and China.
As this paper will discuss in detail, in both China and Russia, large state monopoly enterprises 
are born one after another as they move toward a market economy. Older, state-owned enterprises 
will convert to large state monopoly enterprises, and the latter have a marked inﬂ uence not only on 
the country, but also on the world economy.
In East Asia, the market-centered corporate governance in Japan and other countries, along 
with the large state monopoly enterprises in China and Russia, is developing a new form of 
competition. The previous economic system competition is changing into the corporate system 
competition. In such conditions, I would like to examine whether or not the East Asian community 
can be established.
Section 1 summarizes East Asian business activity and its financial markets. Section 2
discusses Chinese corporate governance; Section 3 discusses corporate governance in Russia, 
Singapore, Korea and Taiwan. Finally, Section 4 summarizes East Asian corporate governance and 
the East Asian community.
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1  Securities Markets in East Asia
First, I would like to survey the securities market in the world and East Asia. Figure 1
summarizes the aggregate market value of the major securities markets in the world and Asia from 
1990 to 2007 based on a report from the World Federation of Exchanges.
The increase in the NYSE is remarkable, while the stagnation of Tokyo is conspicuous among 
major world markets. However, the huge expansion of the Shanghai and Shenzhen market, which 
have supported rapid economic growth in China, warrants attention. Both markets were founded in 
1990*1. These market’s ﬁ rst data in this report were published in 2002.
Although the Shanghai general index had reached 5,000 at the end of 2007, it fell below 2,000 
on September 16, 2008. Even if we subtract the negative inﬂ uence of the U.S. ﬁ nancial crisis, we 
still see that the bubble was included in the Chinese stock market.
*1 The examination of the history of the Shanghai market, its development before World War II, the 
abolition by the People’s Republic of China and its comparison with the current market will become an 
important subject.
  The study on Shanghai market is closely related to the research on the historical development of 
Chinese companies as well.
Figure 1    Domestic Market Capitalization (Main & Parallel Markets) (in USD millions) 
Source: World Federation of Exchanges
Nasdaq NYSE Hong
Kong
Exchanges
Korea
Exchange
Shanghai
SE
Shenzhen
SE
Singapore
Exchange
Taiwan
SE Corp.
Tokyo SE London
SE
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I will examine how companies in each East Asian country have developed, supporting a 
growth of such a ﬁ nancial market. Before examining the latest trends, I will survey the features 
of companies in each East Asian country on January 4, 2000, via the FT Global 500 2000 by The 
Financial Times Ltd. Its ﬁ nancial data are mainly from the end of 1998. Since these data are based 
on the aggregate stock market value from early on, we can make the comparative examination for a 
longer period.
A noteworthy feature of Table 1 is that Chinese and Russian companies are not included in 
Global 500 companies. In terms of the industrial composition, the fixed-line telecommunication 
services company occupies the higher rank, and there is no cellular phone services company. Both 
of the above dramatic changes have been brought about in only eight years. Alternatively, when you 
exclude ﬁ xed-line telecommunication service companies, the companies in the other four countries 
and region do not experience much of a change.
2  Chinese Corporate Governance
In Sections 2 and 3, I will survey East Asian business activity through FT Global 500 2008. 
This investigation is based on the stock price on March 31, 2008. Its ﬁ nancial data come mainly 
from the end of 2007. Although the stock price in each country is already falling, it is still high.
Since shareholder capitalism is now developing, the aggregate stock market value standard is 
the most suitable method to evaluate a company. However, since FT’s data are based on the stock 
price at one speciﬁ c point in time, some problems may arise in the comparison among companies 
and the comparison among different periods.
For all listed companies or most of them the corporate governance in each country can be 
examined. However, I think the better method is to make representative companies’ detailed 
data transparent, thereby making their real image understandable to more people. Because the 
representative companies make up such a high ratio, this is a successful means of disseminating 
critical information. Conversely, summing up all listed companies can be often misleading, as the 
importance of major players will be overlooked. 
The sales standard’s ranking is often used in China and other developing countries. It shows 
that the scale of an economy and a company is the valuation standard in these countries. 
The U.S. has the most companies in the FT Global 500 2008 at 169 (9,617 billion dollars). 
Japan follows with 39 companies (1,601 billion dollars). There are 25 Chinese companies, worth 
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1,962 billion dollars, exceeding Japanese companies. Thirteen Russian companies are worth 820 
billion dollars. In this way, China and Russia have come to hold major companies in the world in a 
short period of time.
2.1  Chinese Companies in FT Global 500 2008
Table 2 is a list of 25 Chinese companies and ten Hong Kong companies in the FT Global 500 
2008. When we examine Chinese companies by industry, we ﬁ nd many ﬁ nance-related businesses: 
eight banks, two life insurance companies and one ﬁ nancial institution. Seven are oil and mining 
companies: two oil and gas producers, three industrial metals and mining and two mining 
companies. The concentration of the ﬁ nance and mining sectors is remarkable. Top ten companies 
are especially likely to fall into these two industries.
In China, where the ﬁ nancial market is behind, a large amount of funds is concentrated within 
the banks, especially since so many people deposit funds into them*2. It is no surprise that the 
banking sector becomes a representative industry. We often see that state-owned oil and natural 
resources enterprises are big businesses in many developing countries.
The aggregate market value of China’s top company, PetroChina, is 424 billion dollars. 
Second-ranked Indl & Coml Bank of China is valued at 277 billion dollars. They are overwhelming 
other companies within their respective industries.
Of Hong Kong companies, the aggregate market value of China Mobile is 298 billion dollars, 
and it makes up approximately one half of the total market value of ten companies. China Mobile is 
a big business with 69.3% share in mainland China. Subsequently, the composition ratio of General 
industrials, such as Hutchison Whampoa, and Real estate investment & services such as Sun Hung 
Kai Properties, is high, and it differs considerably from mainland business composition.
The PE ratio and Dividend Yield of all Chinese and Hong Kong companies in Table 2 are 
16.0 and 17.8, and 2.6 and 2.3, respectively. The Dividend Yield is high, following Singapore. As I 
will examine later, this may mean that these companies give proﬁ ts to their main stockholders, the 
government and state-owned enterprises. We must note this result from now on.
*2  Regarding the money ﬂ ow in China, refer to the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (2005), 
Chapter 2, Section 4 “The money ﬂ ow in East Asia, and the ﬁ nancial environment.” Through this data, 
we reconﬁ rm the importance of ﬁ nancial institutions.
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Next I will unify these 35 companies and examine the primary stockholders of the top 20 
companies. Of these, mainland Chinese companies hold 14 positions and Hong Kong companies 
make up six.
In order to examine the corporate governance in each country, we have to first determine 
the stockholders. Until recently there were numerous studies on the decision-making systems of 
Chinese companies, such as the boards of directors. I would like to emphasize that an examination 
of the stockholders’ conditions is preferential. This is especially preferred since stockholder 
capitalism is dominant throughout the world, and the rule of state-owned enterprises lasted so 
long in China and Russia. And then, it will be necessary to show how the decision-making process 
inside a company functions and how a unique political system, such as the Communist Party, is 
participating in decision-making in China.
In Table 3, based on data disclosed by ET Net Limited and the Hong Kong securities exchange 
and supplemented partly by each company’s annual report, I list the two major stockholders of 20 
companies. It is excellent that these data are easily attainable regarding those Chinese and Hong 
Kong companies. We may conclude that the special existence of Hong Kong, with its long history 
and open ﬁ nancial market, especially the Hong Kong securities exchange, aided the privatization 
and development of Chinese companies.
The first feature to note in Table 3 is that the state-owned enterprises are the largest 
stockholders and have an overwhelming status in almost all companies. The highest ownership 
ratio is 86.3% of CNPC, the stockholder of PetroChina. The same may be said regarding CHINA 
MOBILE (HK), with 74.3% stake in the Hong Kong company, China Mobile.
When Chinese companies advanced privatization, the entirety of state-owned enterprises were 
not privatized, but the most competitive sections were. The state-owned enterprises became holding 
companies of privatized companies. This is the easiest and quickest method of privatization*3.
However, this form may also leave an unprofitable sector and an inefficient section 
simultaneously, and in some cases, it is possible to affect a public corporation’s business activity. 
Therefore, it becomes important to clarify the interdependent relations between a holding company 
and a public corporation.
The second feature is that a bank is controlled by the government (MOF OF THE PRC), the 
*3 In detail, refer to Imai (2008).
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government ﬁ nancial institutions and a sovereign wealth fund (CENTRAL SAFE INV*4) directly. 
The latter will be examined later. The same can be said of three large banks, Indl & Coml Bank of 
China, China Construction Bank and Bank of China.
The form of privatization in China is very uniform, and will be found in almost all Chinese 
companies. The only exception in the top 20 companies is the case of China Merchants Bank. 
The two major stockholders’ ownership ratio is just 24.1%. However, according to the company’s 
annual report, the total of the state-owned stock is 45.15%.
Next I will examine the world representative banks, and the position Chinese banks hold 
within them. Table 4 lists the world representative banks according to The Banker. The current 
global ﬁ nancial crisis has resulted in the purchase of two banks. The HBOS was acquired by the 
British bank, Lloyds TSB Group (the 32nd rank of The Banker), and Wachovia Corporation was 
bought by the U.S. bank, Wells Fargo & Co (the 23rd rank of The Banker).
Notice the high status of Chinese banks. The Chinese banks shown in Table 3, ICBC, Bank 
of China and China Construction Bank Corporation, are ranked highly. The Bank of China stands 
ﬁ rst of the 20 banks as ranked by soundness, and China Construction Bank Corporation is ﬁ rst in 
performance.
However, I would like to call attention to the fact that Chinese banks were not entirely 
privatized from a former national commercial bank. As a preventive measure against bad loans, 
in the old national commercial banks public funds were injected and bad loans were partially 
transferred to assets management companies (AMC). As a result, national commercial banks 
improved, while the government amassed the problem. In that sense, the Chinese ﬁ nancial system 
makes transparency difﬁ cult.
The third feature is that ownership of financial institutions in developed countries is 
progressing steadily. When the Chinese government wants to privatize within a short time, it cannot 
help depending upon ﬁ nancial institutions in developed countries with a large amount of funds.
The Chinese companies of which the Hong Kong-based British HSBC is the largest 
stockholder are the Bank of Communications and Ping An Insurance. In addition to these 
*4  This company is the subsidiary of China Investment Corporation (CIC). Incidentally, in each bank’s 
English annual report, this company is indicated as Huijin.
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institutions, we have the following cases: DEUTSCHE BANK AG (6.25%) in PetroChina, BANK 
OF AMERICA (11.2%) in China Construction Bank, J.P.MORGAN CHASE & CO. (7.5%) in 
China Life Insurance and others. They are the second largest stockholders, following a state-owned 
parent company, and they are very important stockholders of Chinese companies.
In addition, the stockholding by these banks can be conjectured to be the stockholding by the 
substitute of institutional investors in each country. Since these institutional investors are predicted 
to take the position of stockholder activism, Chinese companies will be strongly inﬂ uenced. 
Finally, I would like to summarize Hong Kong-based companies. The representative Hong 
Kong companies are Sun Hung Kai Properties (controlled by DIRECTOR WALTER KWOK 
& FAMILY) and Cheung Kong (controlled by DIRECTOR LI KA SHING). The latter controls 
Hutchison Whampoa. Such large, family-run conglomerates are already exceptional in the world.
What is important is that the situation has not changed since I examined in Shimpo (1998, 
227-31). In a 1995 investigation by Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Hutchison Whampoa was the third 
largest Hong Kong company. The ownership ratio of Cheung Kong by LI KA SHING was 33.4% 
and the ownership ratio of Hutchison Whampoa by Cheung Kong was 44.1%. Sun Hung Kai 
Properties was the sixth largest company, and the ownership ratio by DIRECTOR WALTER 
KWOK & FAMILY was 45.6%. For the former company, two ownership ratios are rising.
2.2  Chinese Companies based on Investigation of China
The examination in Section 2.1 was based on the investigation of the aggregate stock market 
value by FT. Next, I will consider the investigation of China Enterprise Confederation/ China 
Enterprise Directors Association, “Top 500 Chinese companies in 2007.” This investigation is based 
on sales in the 2006 ﬁ scal year, and is mainly an examination of the parent company. I would like to 
call attention to what is different from the FT rankings. This ranking does not include Hong Kong 
companies.
Table 5 lists the top 30 companies based upon this examination. Each representative listed 
company is shown in the right column of each company.
Table 5 shows representative Chinese state-owned enterprises. The three largest state-owned 
enterprises are China Petrochemical Corporation, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) 
and State Grid Corporation of China. The State Grid Corporation of China is said to go public 
under preparation along with China Southern Power Grid Co., Ltd., Agricultural Bank of China and 
others.
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Table 5   Top 30 Chinese Companies by Sales
FT Company
Sales in 2006 
(ten thousand 
yuan)
Public Company Ownership Ratio (%) Index
1 6 China Petrochemical Corporation 106,466,742 China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation 75.84 HSI, H-share
2 1 China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) 89,380,643
PetroChina Company Lim-
ited 86.29 HSI, H-share
3 State Grid Corporation of China 85,452,374
4 3 Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited 29,089,700 HSI, H-share
5 2 China Mobile Communications Corpo-ration 28,631,777 China Mobile Limited 74.33
HSI, Red-
Chip
6 5 Bank of China 24,219,200 HSI, H-share
7 China Southern Power Grid Co., Ltd. 22,295,670
8 7 China Life Insurance (Group) Company 20,984,606 China Life Insurance(Group) Company 68.37 HSI, H-share
9 China Telecom Group 19,764,546 China Telecom Corporation Limited 70.89 H-share
10 Agricultural Bank of China 19,512,800
11 Sinochem Corporation 18,423,495 Sinofert Holdings Limited 74.00 Red-Chip
12 20 Baosteel Group Corp. 18,068,121 Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd 73.97 SSE 180
13 China Railway Engineering Corpora-tion (CRECG) 16,359,641
China Railway Group Lim-
ited (China Railway) 58.30 SSE 180
14 4 China Construction Bank 15,159,300 HSI, H-share
15 China Railway Construction Corpora-tion 14,936,825
China Railway Construction 
Corporation Limited (CRCC) 63.31
16 China FAW Group Corporation 14,916,914
17 Bailian Group Co., Ltd. 14,823,300 Shanghai Bailian Group CO.,LTD. 44.01 SSE 180
18 China State Construction Engineering Corporation 14,480,421
China Overseas Land & 
Investment Ltd 51.84
HSI, Red-
Chip
19 Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (Group) 14,358,363
SAIC Motor Corporation 
Ltd. 83.83 SSE 180
20 COFCO Limited 14,312,948 China Foods Limited 74.25 Red-Chip
21 Dongfeng Motor Corporation 14,168,729 Dongfeng Motor Group Company Limited 66.86 H-share
22 Legend Holdings Ltd. 13,894,689 Lenovo Group Limited 45.13 Red-Chip
23 China Minmetals Corporation 13,475,041 Minmetals Resources Lim-ited 62.39
24 9 China National Offshore Oil Corpora-tion (CNOOC) 13,236,357 CNOOC Limited 64.95
HSI, Red-
Chip
25 15 China Ocean Shipping (Group) Com-pany 12,288,250
China COSCO Holdings 
Company Limited 53.57 H-share
26 China Development Bank 11,718,722
27 China Communications Constructions Group (Limited) 11,499,171
China Communications 
Construction Company Ltd. 70.13 H-share
28 Haier Group 10,750,597 Haier Electronics Group Co., Ltd. 74.68
29 19 Aluminum Corporation of China (CHI-NALCO) 10,606,581
Aluminum Corporation of 
China Limited (CHALCO) 41.82 HSI, H-share
30 China North Industries Group Corpora-tion (CNGC) 10,595,861
Note:  HIS: Hang Seng Index, Red-Chip: Hang Seng China-Afﬁ liated Corporations Index, H-Share: Hang Seng China 
Enterprises Index.
Source1: China Enterprise Confederation/ China Enterprise Directors Association.
2: Company’s Annual Report and other ofﬁ cial documents.
3: Regarding indexes, T&C Financial Research ed. (2008).
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Eleven of the FT companies are also found on this list of 30 companies. There is a difference 
between a company’s aggregate stock market value and its sales standard. Six companies are 
without an important listed company.
Shown in Table 5 is the parent company’s sales and its shareholding ratio to the listed 
subsidiary. In Table 5, only the largest stockholder of the listed subsidiary is shown. However, the 
conclusion obtained in the examination in Table 3 is also applied.
I will examine the companies whose largest stockholder’s ownership ratio is 50% or less. First, 
Table 3 shows the FT’s 19th ranked Aluminum Corporation of China Limited (CHALCO). For 
Lenovo Group Limited, the second largest stockholder is IBM CORP, following Legend Holdings 
Ltd. IBM CORP’s ownership ratio is 4.74% and the remaining ownership is dispersed. However, I 
cannot conﬁ rm whether the remaining shares are held by local or foreign companies. For Shanghai 
Bailian Group CO., LTD., I cannot determine the leading stockholder except Bailian Group Co., 
Ltd. in this company’s data.
Through the previous examination, the stockholding relationship between a parent company 
and its listed subsidiary becomes considerably clear. However, regarding the entire relationship 
between them, much is not disclosed. This is called “the holding company risk”*5.
Each market index shows what kind of evaluation these companies have received in the 
market. Table 5 shows which index each company is included under. The representative companies 
often compose three Hong Kong indices, the Hang Seng Index (HSI), the Hang Seng China-
Affiliated Corporations Index, Red-Chip and the Hang Seng China Enterprises Index, 
H-share. As the company rank becomes lower, some companies are listed under the SSE180 in the 
Shanghai market.
In Tables 2 and 3, a manufacturing company is rare. In Table 5, the huge automobile companies, 
such as China FAW Group Corporation, Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (Group) and 
Dongfeng Motor Corporation ﬁ nally appear. This is because the automobile companies depend so 
much upon foreign companies. I will examine this problem in detail in the following section.
2.3  Foreign-afﬁ liated Firms in China
In the previous section, the manufacturing industry, one of the most important industries for 
Chinese economic development, and its relationship with foreign capital was not discussed. In this 
*5 Watanabe (2002).
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section, I would like to examine this problem, based on MOFCOM’s “Query about Data of Top 500 
Sales.”
Table 6 regroups the top 30 companies by their investing countries. Although Chinese 
companies are included in Table 6, I do not examine them in this paper. There are some cases where 
we cannot get the subsidiary’s data because of size and unavailability of parent company data.
Table 6 shows that Taiwan is the largest investing country. There are six Taiwanese companies 
on the list, and their sales amount to 361 billion yuan. There are many electronic-related companies, 
of which Hong Fu Jin Precision Industry (Shenzhen) Co Ltd. has become the largest foreign-
afﬁ liated ﬁ rm. The second largest Taiwanese company, Shenzhen Futaihong Precision Industrial 
Co., Ltd. belongs to Foxconn International Holdings Limited, whose parent company is the Hon 
Hai Precision Industry Co Ltd. For Taiwanese companies, they own 100% of their subsidiaries, 
which differs from that of developed countries. 
Taiwanese investment in China is, surprisingly, often via tax haven countries. These include 
Samoa, Cayman Islands, the Virgin Islands and others. The information disclosure by Taiwanese 
companies is behind. Detailed data for these parent companies are difficult to get, and so it is 
difﬁ cult to consider Taiwanese companies as the business of an emerging market economy. 
American, German, and Japanese companies follow Taiwanese companies. As an individual 
foreign company, German Volkswagen has four subsidiaries. Volkswagen has two joint subsidiaries 
with China FAW Group Corporation, and two joint subsidiaries with Shanghai Automotive Industry 
Corporation (Group). 
In Table 6, China FAW Group Corporation also has two joint subsidiaries with Toyota Motor, 
and Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (Group) has a joint subsidiary with GM.
Dongfeng Motor Corporation, the third largest Chinese automobile company, also has joint 
subsidiaries. It has established Dongfeng Motor Co., Ltd. with Nissan Motor. Furthermore, 
Dongfeng Motor Corporation established Dongfeng Peugeot Citroen Automobile Company Ltd 
with PSA Peugeot Citroen, and Dongfeng Honda Automobile Co., Ltd. with Honda Motor. (China 
Automotive Industry Yearbook, 75).
Chinese automobile companies can advance technology by linking up with two or more 
foreign companies, and they can lessen their dependence upon a single foreign company. For 
foreign companies to advance in the large, closed Chinese market, an alliance with a single 
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Table 6   Foreign Companies in China, 2006-2007
Rank Company
Sales in 2006 
(ten thousand 
yuan)
Investing 
Country
Parent
Company
Owner-
ship 
Ratio
FT
2 Motorola (China) Electronics Ltd. 8,540,608 US Motorola n.a. 443 Technology hard-ware & equipment
24 Hangzhou Motorola Cellular Equipment Co. Ltd. 3,342,467 US Motorola n.a.
5 Shanghai General Motors Co., Ltd. 5,699,463 US GM 50.0 
Total 17,582,538
3 Nokia Telecommunications Ltd. 7,816,757 Finland Nokia 83.9 43 Technology hard-ware & equipment  
13 Nokia (China) Investment Co., Ltd 4,129,420 Finland Nokia n.a.
Total 11,946,177
7 一汽 -大衆銷售有限責任公司 (Note) 5,386,136 Germany Volkswagen n.a. 61 Automobiles & parts 
9 FAW-Volkswagen Automotive Company 4,774,087 Germany Volkswagen 40.0 
12 SAIC-Volkswagen Sales 4,274,379 Germany Volkswagen n.a.
15 Shanghai-Volkswagen Automotive Company Ltd., 4,017,097 Germany Volkswagen 50.0 
Total 18,451,699
21 Dalian West Paciﬁ c Petro-chemical Co.,Ltd. 3,587,335
Hong Kong 
(France)
TOTAL
FINAELF n.a. 18 Oil & gas producers 
26 Hunan Valin Steel Tube & Wire Co., Ltd. 3,273,401 Netherlands Mittal 29.2 44
Industrial metals & 
mining  
14 FAW Toyota Motor Sales Co. Ltd. 4,055,010 Japan Toyota Motor n.a. 22 Automobiles & parts 
25 Tianjin FAW Toyota Motor Co., Ltd. 3,278,251 Japan Toyota Motor 50.0 
16 Dongfeng Motor Co., Ltd. 4,001,205 Japan Nissan Motor 50.0 227 Automobiles & parts 
28 Nissan (China) Investment Co., Ltd. 3,023,372 Japan Nissan Motor 100.0 
18 Guangzhou Honda Automobile Co., Ltd. 3,939,624 Japan Honda Motor 50.0 147 Automobiles & parts 
Total 18,297,462
29 Beijing-Hyundai Motor Company 2,900,589 Korea Hyundai Mo-tor Company 50.0 
1 Hong Fu Jin Precision Industry (Shenzhen) Co Ltd. 15,707,567
Samoa (Tai-
wan)
Hon Hai Pre-
cision Industry 
Co Ltd.
100.0 238 Technology hard-ware & equipment
8 Shenzhen Futaihong Precision Industrial Co., Ltd. 5,262,490 Taiwan
Foxconn Inter-
national Hold-
ings Limited
100.0 
10 Inventec Hi-Tech Corporation 4,621,308
Cayman 
Islands
 (Taiwan)
Inventec
Corporation 100.0 
19 Tech-Front (Shanghai) Computer Co.,Ltd. 3,827,666
The Virgin 
Islands
 (Taiwan)
Quanta
Computer 100.0 
20 Tech-Com (Shanghai) Computer Co.,Ltd. 3,802,223
The Virgin 
Islands
 (Taiwan)
Quanta
Computer 100.0 
30 TPV Electronics (Fujian) Company Limited 2,880,037 Taiwan
TPV
Technology 
Limited
100.0 
Total 36,101,291
22 Lenovo Information Products (Shenzhen) Co. Ltd. 3,577,608
Singapore 
(Hong Kong 
market)
Lenovo Group 
Limited 100.0 
Note: English company name is unconﬁ rmed.
Source 1: MOFCOM and The 21st Century China Research Institute.
2: Company’s Annual Report and other ofﬁ cial documents.
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Chinese company is accompanied by great risk. As such, both sides’ strategy often leads to peculiar 
relationships.
Thus, many major subsidiaries of Chinese automobile companies are composed of an unlisted 
joint firm with two or more foreign companies. Furthermore, a listed company within a group 
is also a member of each group. Such complicated relationships make the actual state of these 
companies unclear. The above conditions make the position of Chinese automobile companies low 
in terms of their stock market value.
2.4  Fundamental Features of Chinese Companies
Chinese companies appearing as a result of the policy of reform in 1978 and afterwards are 
characterized as being State Monopoly Enterprises based on the previous examination. They 
are distinguished from a State-Owned Enterprise, which the government owns entirely, in the 
socialist age.
The term State Monopoly Enterprise is not very often currently used. Marxian economists 
use the term State Monopoly Capitalism when referring to the developing stages of monopoly 
capitalism. As mentioned below, the term State Monopoly Enterprise is appropriate in characterizing 
a former socialist country’s company which continues its dominance in the economy on the basis of 
building a market economy.
The following are features of state monopoly enterprises:
1. Although a state-owned enterprise is privatized, it maintains approximately a two thirds 
ownership ratio as a holding company, and thus substantially controls its management. Its corporate 
governance very much differs from the popular market-centered corporate governance in developed 
countries.
2. The most efﬁ cient part of all state-owned enterprise resources is that they are transferred to a 
public corporation, and state monopoly enterprises maintain monopolistic status in each market. 
This monopoly often becomes not only a domestic monopoly, but a global monopoly as well due to 
China’s large size.
3. Such a monopolistic position brought about the adhesion and uniﬁ cation with politics, and, in 
certain cases, corruption. 
State monopoly enterprises also have the following features in the age of economic 
globalization:
1. The overseas institutional investor is often a second largest stockholder after a state-owned 
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enterprise.
2. In the more advanced industries, such as automobile and electronics, the dependence on foreign 
companies is varied and strong.
In the ﬁ rst stage of industrialization, a state monopoly enterprise often creates an environment 
that efficiently promotes economic growth. Take, for example, the postwar period. The role of 
government, family-run conglomerates*6 and state monopoly enterprises was critical to the East 
Asian export-oriented industrialization. However, as a state monopoly enterprise grows, the harmful 
effects, such as organizational bureaucratization and the monopoly’s market control, appear. As 
people’s lives become richer, criticism of the conditions is brought to light. This is the change that 
happened in East Asia.
In this process, Chinese corporate governance is shifting from the socialism model, in which 
a state-owned enterprise governs the overall economy, to the developing country model in which a 
state-owned enterprise, family-run conglomerates and a foreign company all have great inﬂ uence. 
Since both China and Russia seceded from the socialism model, the corporate governance of 
socialism models will lose much of their inﬂ uence on the world.
I will discuss briefly about the relationship between Chinese corporate governance and its 
foreign direct investment (FDI). Though China is a host country of FDI, the outward FDI increases 
rapidly. In another paper, I will examine this situation in detail. Generally, there is close relationship 
between the corporate governance and FDI. I have already considered about this relationship in the 
Japanese case in detail.
Table 7 is the list of top 20 Chinese companies by FDI stock in 2007. Unfortunately, the 
amount of each company’s stock isn’t shown. The state owned enterprises which appear in Table 
5 including China National Petroleum Corporation, China Petrochemical Corporation line up. The 
ﬁ fth-ranked China Resources (Holdings) Co., Ltd. and the sixth-ranked CITIC Group in Table 5 
ranked 33rd and 42nd respectively.
In China, state monopoly enterprises have heavy inﬂ uences in the entire economy, and they 
lead the foreign investment at the same time.
How will Chinese companies change? If the Chinese government is going to further advance 
*6 Family-run conglomerates mean Zaibatsu in Japanese.
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privatization, it will be difﬁ cult to ﬁ nd stockholders for the huge Chinese companies. Until now, the 
development of a private institutional investor has not been enough in China. Thus, the role of an 
overseas institutional investor will become more important as a stockholder of Chinese companies. 
Since the control of the government or a state-owned enterprise also cannot but become relatively 
weaker, this has been a difﬁ cult issue for the Chinese government.
Moreover, regarding the dependence upon foreign companies, the Chinese government wants 
to weaken this dependence and aims at nationalization. However, since the technical innovation in 
the developed country’s companies has rapidly progressed and the innovation ﬁ eld has expanded, 
the alliance of Chinese companies with the developed country’s companies is deepening. 
Furthermore, if the capital market’s liberalization is advanced, M&A by companies in developed 
countries will also be actively performed.
In this way, state monopoly enterprises stand at a crossroad. The crossroad is whether to 
join the global economy, turn back to a closed national economy, so-called socialism again. This 
depends upon the intentions of the Chinese government and its people. To reach a decision, they 
will need to ask what the state and political system’s role in supporting a state monopoly enterprise 
should be.
Table 7   The 40 Largest Chinese Companies Ranked by Outward FDI Stock, 2007
No. Name of Enterprise Rank in Table 5 FT
1 China National Petroleum Corporation 2 1
2 China Petrochemical Corporation 1 6
3 China National Offshore Oil Corporation 24 9
4 China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company 25 15
5 China Resources (Holdings) Co., Ltd.
6 CITIC Group 
7 China National Cereals, Oils & Foodstuffs Corp 20
8 China Mobile Communications Corporation 5 2
9 Sinochem Corporation 11
10 China Merchants Group 
11 Shum Yip Holdings Company Limited
12 China Shipping (Group) Company 
13 China National Aviation Holding Corporation 
14 China National Chemical Corporation 
15 China State Construction Engineering Corporation 18
16 SinoSteel Corporation 
17 China Network Communications Group Corporation 
18 Aluminum Corporation of China 29 19
19 GDH Limited 
20 China Minmetals Corporation 23
Note: Some errors in the original table are corrected.
Source: http://hzs2.mofcom.gov.cn/accessory/20080928/1222502733006.pdf
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The number of studies on Chinese corporate governance, especially on its decision-making 
process, is increasing. I would like to introduce some of the studies and comment on them.
Hovey (2006) is one of the most comprehensive studies on Chinese corporate governance. He 
focuses on institutional ownership through Legal Person holding companies, distinguishing a state-
owned enterprise and foreign subsidiaries. However, he does not adequately clarify the individual 
data regarding the institutional ownership through Legal Person holding companies. Li (2008) 
outlines a governance evaluation system and establishes a corporate governance index.
Based upon the knowledge gained from these studies, I believe the following: We seldom 
ﬁ nd studies on the actual conditions of a state-owned enterprise, its successor and the relationship 
between them, especially on the development process of privatization and the comprehensive 
structural reform in China.
The old argument appears again. The famous Max Weber and others’ comparative discussion 
on the Western Protestantism, the Eastern Confucianism and the important difference in the 
economy and the management system between them. As a result, the Eastern or Asian common 
features, the communitarianism are found (Chen, 29). As I will examine the characteristics of each 
Asian country’s company in Section 3.3, there is no need of further discussion on this theme. 
As I will discuss later, we can’t detect even the pan-Chinese management, the argument on 
Asian management which targets a wider range will be unrealistic.
3  Corporate Governance in Russia, Singapore, Korea and Taiwan
In Section 3, I will examine the important countries in East Asia other than China. In this 
paper, I will consider Russia especially. Russia’s political and economic role in East Asia and the 
world is expanding. Examining Russia is indispensable to the understanding of China, which this 
paper has already focused on in detail. In the second half of Section 3, I will survey Singapore, 
Korea and Taiwan.
3.1  Russian Corporate Governance
First, in Table 8, I would like to list the companies from the four countries and regions shown 
in FT Global 500 2008. Of these, Russian companies number 13, and their aggregate market value 
is 820 billion dollars. 
Of the Russian companies, ﬁ ve are oil and gas, making this industry highly represented. The 
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status of Gazprom is especially conspicuous. Although I have already characterized the old Soviet 
Union as an oil exporting country and other socialist countries as manufactured products exporting 
(Shimpo, 1998, 186-7), their economic structure has not changed much. The increase in oil prices 
raised the economic status of Russia. This differs from China where foreign capital brought in by 
the manufacturing industry advanced their economy.
Besides Russia’s oil & gas producers, there are three industrial metals & mining companies, 
two banks and two mobile telecommunications companies on the list. The remarkable feature in 
particular is not found in all Russian companies’ PE ratio or Dividend Yield.
Next, I will examine the stockholders of Russian companies. We cannot indicate that the 
information disclosure of Russian companies is progressing as the whole. Therefore, I will examine 
the Russian companies based on information acquired from each company; for some companies, 
sufﬁ cient information was not obtained.
As shown in Table 9, the largest company is Gazprom. Gazprom is the world’s largest natural 
gas production and supply company, and as Table 10 will examine in detail, it provides approximately 
20% of the world’s natural gas. Half of the company’s stock is owned by the government, and the 
chairman of the board is President Medvedev. For the other half, world investors own stock via 
ADRs (American Depositary Receipts). Although detailed information is not clear, stock shares are 
controlled by many owners.
I will briefly discuss the relationship between Gazprom and Japan. Gazprom disregarded 
conventional business customs and acquired the majority (50% + 1 share) of the rights and interests 
of the Sakhalin II project from Shell, Mitsubishi Corporation and MITSUI & CO., LTD. They 
secured management rights to this project in 2007*7.
The second largest company Rosneft is owned 75% by OJSC ROSNEFTEGAZ. Since OJSC 
ROSNEFTEGAZ is wholly owned by the government, Rosneft is substantially controlled by the 
government.  It is the largest oil production company in Russia, founded upon the Soviet Union 
Ministry of Oil Industry.
The largest stockholder of the third-ranked oil company, Lukoil, is ING Bank Eurasia ZAO*8 
(nominee). ING Bank (Eurasia) ZAO is a wholly owned subsidiary of the ING group. ING’s 
*7 Petroleum Association of Japan (2008).
*8 ZAO is a nonpublic type joint stock company (Moriyama, 2007, 24-27).
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wholesale banking in Russia is the largest asset management organization (custodian), overseeing 
more than 135 billion dollars in assets and providing services to 500 or more domestic and foreign 
customers. Thus, we can conjecture that Lukoil’s stocks are widely held, and its privatization is 
developing remarkably*9.
There are some companies with comparative features; Mobile Telesystems, of which ING 
Bank (Eurasia) ZAO owns 41.3%, and MMC Norilsk Nickel, of which THE BANK OF NEW 
YORK INTERNATIONAL NOMINEES owns 30.4%.
In contrast with the above companies, are banks under strong governmental control, such as 
Sberbank of Russia and VTB Bank. Moreover, there are also some family-run conglomerates such 
as those in Hong Kong. They are Novolipetsk Steel, which Vladimir Lisin-owned FLETCHER 
GROUP HOLDINGS LIMITED controls, and SeverStal, which Alexey Mordashov owns.
The governance of representative Russian companies is quite various. This seems to be 
different from the privatization of Chinese companies, where government leadership still firmly 
rules. Like Chinese companies, Russian state-owned enterprises do not necessarily continue as 
holding companies. However, as a whole, we can conclude as Chinese companies, large state 
monopoly enterprises still play the more important role.
In Russia, political power is again being rapidly centralized within a speciﬁ c individual and 
group. Thus we cannot deny the possibility of a reversal of the current privatization by politicians, 
such as the Sakhalin II project has attempted in recent years. For the moment, institutional investors 
in developed countries, which are an important leader in Russian companies, are confronted with 
the difficult decision of whether to maintain the present status or to withdraw to some extent 
because of rising political strain.
The reason state monopoly enterprises have played such an important role in China and 
Russia is because these companies successfully took over important features, such as management 
resources and corporate culture, from state-owned enterprises in the socialist system.
The following are the redeﬁ ned fundamental features of a socialist system:
1. The concentration of political and economic power within the state, the monopolistic rule of the 
economy by a governmental sector and a state-owned enterprise and an economic gap leading to 
inequality throughout.
2. The economy is closed and the division of labor is ﬁ xed among socialist countries.
*9  Regarding Russian oil and natural gas companies, refer to Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National 
Corporation edited (2008), Tabata edited (2008), Kaya (2007).
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3. The state monopolizes information, intercepting the inﬂ ow from overseas. Nothing resulted from 
this political system except the state’s corruption, scandal and delay of economic development. 
Although they have paid the price and were established in every socialist country, it could not but 
disintegrate as a matter of fact after all.*10
A state-owned enterprise is the core of a socialist system, and privatization becomes a symbol 
of demolition of this system.
3.2  World Oil and Natural Gas Companies
Thus far, I have examined Chinese and Russian companies. In both countries, the status of oil 
and gas companies was extraordinarily high, especially in Russia. Consequently, in this section, I 
will examine the world’s oil and gas companies.
In the 1990s, the price of oil settled down, with a barrel going for 30 dollars or less*11. In the 
2000s, the price went up, and even cost upwards of 140 dollars a barrel in 2008. A fundamental 
factor is the expansion of demand spurred by the rapid development of BRICs and others. It will 
take a long time to convert to alternative energy sources, and the global ﬁ nancial crisis setting oil as 
an object of speculation will not change either. Although we can predict that oil will not persist at a 
cost of 140 dollars per barrel, the high levels of price and demand will continue for the time being. 
With the help of escalating oil prices, the world’s oil companies performed well and 
experienced rising stock prices. According to an oil company list summarized by Petroleum 
Intelligence Weekly, nine of 20 companies are state-owned enterprises. Among the countries 
holding a state-owned enterprise, there are many OPEC countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
Based on this fact, we can see that oil acts as a major determinant of national strategy in these 
countries.
The Chinese and Russian companies included in the PIW’s table are China’s CNPC and 
Russia’s Gazprom and Lukoil. Although CNPC is a 100% state owned company, as already 
discussed, its subsidiary, PetroChina, is also listed and has become the largest company in China. In 
PIW’s table, although Chinese and Russian companies are not necessarily the most prominent, they 
are emerging among the world’s major players. In this sense, Seven Sisters, which once consisted 
*10  Regarding the issue of why the huge concentrated power system called socialism was born in these 
countries, it will be necessary to examine not only the international environment at the time, but also 
the history and social structure of these countries before socialism.
*11 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2008.
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of only developed countries’ companies, will change greatly.
Here I will examine the amount of production and the estimated reserves in three 
representative Chinese and Russian oil and natural gas companies. As shown in Table 10, the status 
of OPEC countries in oil production is overwhelming, especially in terms of estimated reserves. 
For natural gas, the status of Russia, especially Gazprom, is remarkably high. It makes up 18.7% of 
production and 16.8% of estimated reserves.
In terms of oil production, Rosneft and Lukoil lead Russia. China does not produce as much oil 
and gas as, or have the reserves of, Russia. However, the concentration of the top three companies, 
especially PetroChina, is high*12.
Table 10   Russian and Chinese Oil Companies
Reserve Oil, million barrels
Natural gas, billion cubic 
metres
Gazprom 11,102.2 29,785.4 16.8%
Rosneft 13,365.0 192.0
Lukoil 15,715.0 790.7
3 Companies Total 40,182.2 30,768.1
Russia Total 79,400.0 6.4% 44,650.0 25.2%
PetroChina 11,706.0 1,617.4
Sinopec 2,231.0 9.3
CNOOC 1,564.1 176.2
3 Companies Total 15,501.1 1,802.9
China Total 15,500.0 1.3% 1,880.0 1.1%
World 1,237,900.0 100% 177,360.0 100%
OPEC 934,700.0 75.5%
Production Oil, million barrels
Natural Gas, billion 
cubic metres
Gazprom 250.0 548.6 18.7%
Rosneft 740.0 15.7
Lukoil 713.0 9.7
3 Companies Total 1,703.0 574.0
Russia Total 3,642.0 12.2% 607.4 20.7%
PetroChina 838.8 46.1
Sinopec 196.7 0.8
CNOOC 135.7 5.8
3 Companies Total 1,171.2 52.6
China Total 1,366.2 4.6% 69.3 2.4%
World 29,759.5 100% 2,940.0 100%
OPEC 12,849.5 43.2%
Note:  According to BP’s data, each company’s data is converted based on the ratio, 1 barrel = 0.136 
tonnes and 1 cubic metre = 35.31 cubic feet.
Source: BP (2008) and company’s Annual Report.
*12  Regarding Chinese oil and natural gas companies, refer Guo (2006), Japan Oil, Gas and Metals 
National Corporation edited (2008).
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3.3  Corporate Governance in Singapore, Taiwan and Korea
Before China and Russia re-surfaced in the East Asian economy, the three countries and 
regions of Singapore, Taiwan and Korea led East Asian industrialization on the basis of a market 
economy.
The city-state Singapore has a peculiar economic structure. Although Singapore has a 
market economy, the role of government and its ﬁ nancial institutions is quite large. Singapore has 
developed both as an international ﬁ nancial market and as a base for international shipments from 
the beginning of its independence. Subsequently, it has developed the electronics industry and 
others. As a result, two Singapore banks are included in Table 11, based on FT Global 500 2008. 
Its stockholders attract much attention. DBS Nominees Pte (Private) Ltd. is a stockholder of four 
companies. DBS Nominees Pte Ltd. is the largest stockholder of DBS Group Holdings Ltd. DBS 
Group Holdings Ltd controls DBS Bank Ltd. entirely, and DBS Bank Ltd controls DBS Nominees 
Pte Ltd.
Of other stockholders, another government ﬁ nancial institution, Temasek Holdings (Private) 
Limited, and its wholly owned subsidiary Maju Holdings Pte Ltd., is included. Temasek Holdings 
provides immense investment for the ﬁ nancial institutions in each country, including Merrill Lynch, 
China Construction Bank and many Singapore companies. This issue will be examined in detail 
below.
I have already examined Singaporean companies and business groups in Shimpo (1998, 
231-4). Like in Hong Kong, the situation in Singapore has not changed much. Although Taiwan 
is a country made up of almost all Chinese people, its companies slightly differ from Singaporean 
companies.
Taiwan was originally a country with comparatively many small and medium-sized 
enterprises. Then the government cultivated the advanced technology industry, including a 
semiconductor industry like Singapore’s. As shown in Table 11, the representative companies are 
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing and Hon Hai Precision Industries. As already discussed, 
in these companies, a number of their subsidiaries play an active part as Chinese leading foreign-
afﬁ liated ﬁ rms.
However, the information disclosed by Taiwanese companies is not necessarily sufﬁ cient, as 
shown in Table 11. Although the role of government was once large, it is gradually retreating as 
seen in the case of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing. Moreover, the family-run conglomerates 
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have not necessarily played a major role as in Hong Kong or the previous Korea.
Incidentally, Hong Kong and Singapore, both former British colonies, have a long history of 
a market economy, and the importance of a market economy is rooted in Taiwan as well. Through 
the previous examination, we can conclude that the role of the state is signiﬁ cant both in mainland 
China and Singapore and that the role of family-run conglomerates is highly developed in Hong 
Kong. Taiwan does not share these same features. Thus, each Chinese-majority country has its own 
individual history, and the term ‘Pan-Chinese management’ is inadequate for summarizing the very 
different styles of management and corporate governance in these countries.
Finally, I will examine Korean companies, including the global electronic company, Samsung 
Electronics. Even now, Korean companies are often mentioned as a typical example of current 
family-run conglomerates. The second largest stockholder of Samsung Electronics is its ﬁ nancial 
institution, Samsung Life Insurance Co. Ltd. The largest stockholder of Hyundai Heavy Industries 
is Mr. Chung Mong-joon.
However, the inﬂ uence of such family-run conglomerates is fading, and institutional investors 
in developed countries are replacing them. They are Citibank N.A., BNP PARIBAS and others. 
Moreover, in the steel industry, in which M&A is performed actively, the largest stockholder of 
Posco is Japanese Nippon Steel Corporation.
Compared with the Chinese and Russian models of rapid development, Taiwanese and Korean 
company power is understated. Companies in the two countries developed market economies and 
market-centered corporate governance quickly, and they have become a driving force of East Asian 
development, along with Japan. When large state monopoly enterprises restrict growth because 
of their strong dependence upon the government, then companies in the two countries will again 
attract world attention.
3.4  World Sovereign Wealth Fund
Here, I will again examine the sovereign wealth fund, which plays an important role in 
Singaporean economic development. In recent years, various sovereign wealth funds have emerged, 
drawing much attention. A large amount of funds is being accumulated in some countries, including 
the oil exporting countries, China and others, by the rapid increase of exports. The sovereign wealth 
fund, a special ﬁ nancial institution of the government, manages the fund. 
The top 20 sovereign wealth funds are listed in Table 12 according to an investigation by The 
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Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute. Abu Dhabi Investment Authority in UAE-Abu Dhabi has a top-
ranking fund. The fund in oil exporting countries is nine. Other high-ranking oil-based funds in 
developed countries are ﬁ ve, including Norway’s Government Pension Fund-Global, which controls 
the North Sea oil ﬁ elds. We also ﬁ nd Singapore’s Government of Singapore Investment Corporation 
and Temasek Holdings, China’s SAFE Investment Company, China Investment Corporation, Hong
Kong Monetary Authority Investment Portfolio and Russia’s National Welfare Fund.
The actual activities of sovereign wealth funds are not easily disclosed. The Sovereign Wealth 
Fund Institute evaluates the transparency of each fund. The transparency of OPEC’s fund is low. 
OPEC is not generally transparent as a country, as an oil company or as a sovereign wealth fund. 
The concentration of precious resources and funds within such countries is an important factor 
contributing to global economic instability.
A large amount of OPEC funds, originating from developed country banks in the 1970s, was 
superﬂ uously given to Latin American countries that underwent rapid development at the time and 
brought about a large amount of accumulated debt. Since even banks in developed country brought 
about such results, the problem persisting into the future will not be small.
For China and Russia, the transparency of Chinese SAFE (State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange) Investment Company and China Investment Corporation (CIC)*13 is also low. 
According to the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, the latter is supposed to hold approximately 10% 
of both Blackstone Group and Morgan Stanley.
Thus, sovereign wealth funds are developing in countries where the government plays a large 
economic role. It is possible for their activities to contribute to the asset management of these 
countries. However, since a competitor on the same scale does not exist in the country, the checks 
upon its investment are weak. It also runs the risk of incurring large losses.
Such a large-scale investor helps the company in the ﬁ nancial crisis. However, at the same 
time, this could potentially weaken company competitiveness.
Considering the status quo of the world economy, the sovereign wealth fund will strengthen its 
presence for the time being. In contrast, judging from a long-term view, the wealth fund will distort 
the function of a market economy, will advance political intervention in the economy and may 
make the world economically unstable.
*13 Established in September 2007. Refer to Jin (2007).
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4  East Asian Corporate Governance and East Asian Community
4.1   East Asian Corporate Governance - From Economic System Competition to Corporate 
System Competition
First, I would like summarize the previous section. Recent occurrences of note include China 
and Russia raising their proﬁ les in East Asia, developing a market economy and creating one after 
another large state monopoly enterprises. New enterprises have ranged from the resource industries 
of oil and gas to financial institutions such as banks and sovereign wealth funds. State-owned 
enterprises were ruling in both China and Russia, and these state-owned enterprises are gradually 
being replaced by state monopoly enterprises.
Alternatively, market-centered corporate governance developed in Japan after the Meiji 
Restoration. This has steadily spread to areas under Japanese influence. After World War II, 
especially after the development of export orientated industrialization, market-centered corporate 
governance was ﬁ rmly planted in Korea and Taiwan.
As a result, in East Asia, the conversion from Economic System Competition, the 
confrontation and competition of political systems to Corporate System Competition, the 
confrontation and competition of two types of companies and corporate governance, are all 
occurring. In present-day East Asia, neither the common Asian corporate governance nor the 
common Asian management system necessarily exists on the basis of tradition, culture and others 
in this area. Conversely, heterogeneous companies and corporate governance are opposing and 
competing.
In the economic system competition, two systems are not mutually connected through trade 
or investment. In the corporate system competition, the competition is appreciably changing. The 
companies, ﬁ nancial institutions and sovereign wealth funds in developed countries invest in large 
state monopoly enterprises and become important stockholders. Moreover, Chinese and Russian 
sovereign wealth funds provide a large amount of investment to companies and ﬁ nancial institutions 
in developed countries, and become important stockholders there as well.
Thus, interdependence has grown. At the same time, the large state monopoly enterprises 
entered into global corporate competition, and thus the character of competition has changed. The 
competition between huge state monopoly enterprises and general public companies has spread 
into many fields. The influence of powerful government-backed state monopoly enterprises has 
influenced the competition. This means changes to political and national confrontation from 
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economic competition. Speciﬁ cally, this confrontation becomes scrambling for oil, natural gas and 
large amounts of funds.
I have discussed the convergence of various corporate governances in the world. 
Fundamentally, this trend will not change. Of course, convergence also impacts the large state 
monopoly enterprises. However, what may also happen is that the convergence process is delayed 
and altered by the state monopoly enterprises. 
4.2   Towards Community on the Basis of Market Economy and Market-Centered Corporate 
Governance
Finally I will examine the possibilities for the East Asian community in the process of 
corporate system competition, of which is actively argued in East Asia.
In East Asia, economic interdependence has quickly developed. It has extended to not only 
trade but also to some forms of investment. The actual conditions of this interdependence have been 
examined in detail. This interdependence supports each country’s economic development. Thus, it 
is natural that arguments ranging from economic integration to political integration are voiced.
However, many have halted their arguments to promote the community without considering 
the actual economic and political conditions of today’s East Asia, and the history of its previous 
economy and politics. Along with disclosing concrete information regarding the economy and 
politics in China and Russia, countries which were closed to international society until recently, the 
immediate unreality of the community is also becoming clear.
Although the economic interdependence through trade and some forms of investment has 
become strong, it is still difﬁ cult to realize economic integration of the free labor movement and 
the high-level monetary union of the EU in present East Asia. The difficulties of the free labor 
movement go without saying, and moving to a Euro-style monetary union cannot be considered at 
this time. 
Furthermore, regarding political integration, it cannot be a subject of concrete discussion for 
the time being. There cannot be any uniﬁ ed political institution between East Asian countries. In 
Japan, Korea, Taiwan and others, political democracy has been established. To the contrary, China 
has a one-party dictatorship, and in Russia the abuse of state power is common, although Russia 
does not have a single-party dictatorship.
I would like to emphasize the following point, especially based upon the examination in this 
paper. It is extremely difﬁ cult to make both the company and enterprise systems function on the 
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basis of market-centered corporate governance. With the controlling power of the state, it is nearly 
impossible for these to coexist as a single system. 
It is possible that companies with widely dispersed stockholding and companies with high state 
ownership may coexist. However, even in such cases, the latter company has accepted the common 
enterprise system, that is, the legal system on the basis of a former company, stock listing standards 
and standards of information disclosure.
Corporate governance is not only a problem of economy and management itself, but also 
a problem of company law and system, social structure and information disclosure. Corporate 
governance sparks a wide range of issues. Therefore, for the time being, through the development 
of globalization of a company or an institutional investor, not only funds and technology but also 
market-centered corporate governance must be transferred and widely spread to establish common 
ground.
Japan’s future role in terms of economic development will be in transferring and exporting 
technology and market-centered corporate governance to all of East Asia. Via this process, the East 
Asian community could move forward.
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